We investigate the importance of "what"-flexibility on top of "where"-and "when"-flexibility for alternative emission control schemes that prescribe long-term temperature targets and eventually impose additional constraints on the rate of temperature change. We find that "what"-flexibility substantially reduces the compliance costs under alternative emission control schemes. When comparing policies that simply involve long-term temperature targets against more stringent strategies that include additional constraints on the rate of temperature increase, it turns out that the latter involve huge additional costs. These costs may be interpreted as additional insurance payments if damages should not only dependent on absolute temperature change but also on the rate of temperature change.
Introduction
Flexibility is a central element in market-based economies in order to foster the efficient use of scarce resources. In the context of climate policy, efficiency translates into questions of how much and what anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should be abated, when, and where, i.e. by whom. Given complete information, comprehensive cost-benefit analysis could deliver precise answers to these questions. However, neither costs nor benefits of GHG emission abatement are easy to quantify. In particular, there are large uncertainties in external cost estimates for climate change. The chain of causality -from GHG emissions to ambient concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, from temperature increase to physical effects such as climatic and sea level changes -is very complex. Moreover, economists do not even agree on the methodology to be used for valuing such potential climate change impacts as the extinction of a species. The large uncertainties in predicting global climate change, as well as quantifying and monetizing the associated biophysical impacts explain much of the controversy on the desirable long-term level of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and the scope and timing of emission mitigation measures.
Presuming that uncertain future outcomes of climate change could be extreme and irreversible, risk aversion may justify the adoption of a precautionary cost-effectiveness approach rather than hinging on traditional cost-benefit analysis (Gollier et al. 2000) . In this vein, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aims at establishing an ample margin of safety based on recommendations from natural science on "tolerable" emission levels. The UNFCCC's stated goal is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC 1992, Article 2). In its Third Assessment Report the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which serves as the scientific advisory board to the UNFCCC, laid out several long-term stabilization scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions with an associated range of expected increases in the global mean temperature (IPCC 2001) . Given some stabilization or likewise temperature targets, rational climate policy should minimize the net economic costs of limiting temperature change. Costeffectiveness suggests that the marginal costs of emission control should be equalized across all sources in space and time.
1 This comes down to comprehensive "where", "when", and
"what"-flexibility. With the first, reductions should take place where it is cheapest to do so, 1
Note that -in contrast to cost-benefit analysis -it is no longer assured that marginal costs are equal to the marginal benefits of emission reduction.
regardless of the geographical location. With the second, reductions should take place when the cost-benefit calculus yields a positive value. With the third, decisions can be taken on what greenhouse gas should be abated under cost-effectiveness considerations.
While the potentials for efficiency gains from "where"-flexibility have been investigated in broader detail (see e.g. Weyant 1999 ), the implications of "when"-flexibility have been analyzed less intensively, and there are only relatively few studies that have addressed aspects of "what"-flexibility. There are good reasons for the shortage of studies on "when"-and "what"-flexibility. First, the quality of data for sources and abatement options of GHGs other than CO 2 is poor. Second, an appropriate analysis of "when"-and "what"-flexibility demands for integrated assessment of economic and climatic relationships in a dynamic framework that poses considerable challenges to modeling. Third, the long-term nature of climate change implies substantial uncertainties in economic analysis as it requires tenuous assumptions on the business-as-usual development that will be a key driver for adjustment costs to some climate policy objective.
Against this background, the primary objective of this paper is to ascertain the relative importance of a multi-gas emission control strategy (in our case: CO 2 and CH 4 ) vis-à-vis a CO 2 -only abatement strategy. In other words: We want to sort out how much can be gained if
we put "what"-flexibility on top of "where"-and "when"-flexibility. The explanatory power of such a comparison depends crucially on the proper design of the overall analytical framework. Therefore, we place special emphasis on the description of the baseline calibration and the integration of climate relationships into PACE, a dynamic multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade and energy use.
Based on numerical simulation with this integrated assessment model we find that "what"-flexibility substantially reduces the compliance costs under alternative emission control schemes. When comparing policies that simply involve long-term temperature targets against more stringent strategies that include additional constraints on the rate of temperature increase, it turns out that the latter involve huge additional costs. These costs may be interpreted as additional insurance payments if damages should not only dependent on absolute temperature change but also the rate of temperature change. Our calculations also confirm the shortcomings of the global warming potential (GWP) approach to represent the contribution of different greenhouse gases to global temperature change because the relative contribution may vary substantially over time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the generic general equilibrium framework that serves as a starting point for subsequent extension to accommodate integrated assessment of multi-gas abatement strategies. Section 3 describes the baseline calibration of our model to long-term projections on economic growth and energy use. Section 4 elaborates the inclusion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (in our case: CH 4 ). Section 5 provides a summary of the reduced-form climate sub-module and its linkage to the energy-economy model.
Section 6 outlines the policy scenarios and interprets the simulation results. Section 7 concludes.
Generic Model Structure
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have become the standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (see e.g. Bergmann
1990
, Grubb et al. 1993 , Weyant 1999 . The main reason for this is that the general equilibrium framework represents price-dependent market interactions as well as the origination and spending of income for various economic agents based on rigorous microeconomic theory.
In this section, we lay out the generic structure of a multi-sector, multi-region CGE framework of global trade and energy use. A multi-region framework is indispensable for the analysis of global GHG emission constraints. In a world that is increasingly integrated through trade, policy interference in open economies not only cause adjustment of domestic production and consumption patterns but also influence international prices via changes in exports and imports. The changes in international prices, i.e. the terms of trade, imply secondary effects, which can significantly alter the impacts of the primary domestic policy (Böhringer and Rutherford 2002) . In addition to the consistent representation of trade links, a detailed tracking of energy flows is a pre-requisite for the assessment of climate policies. Combustion of fossil fuels is a driving force of global warming through the release of the man greenhouse gas CO 2 (CH 4 also originates to a significant share from fossil fuel production and consumption).
Beyond the comprehensive spatial coverage, climate policy analysis requires an explicit dynamic framework since policy interference applies over longer time periods as climate change is an inherently dynamic problem and happens on larger time scales. On the consumption side, dynamics involve the representation of the savings behavior of households. On the production side, dynamics involve the description of investment decisions of firms. To build dynamic features into the modeling of the economic behavior of households and firms one has to make an assumption on the degree of foresight of the economic agents. Assuming that the agents in the model know as much concerning the future as the modeler, implies a model with "consistent expectations" or "perfect foresight" where all agents consistently anticipate all current and future prices ("clairvoyance"). Such a framework reveals plausible effects of policy changes on intertemporal consumption and investment (savings) decisions and allows for the measurement of transitional effects that can be significant relative to long-term impacts.
Below, we first provide a short non-technical summary on the static intra-period submodule and then describe the dynamics of the overall model. Finally, we point out the advantage of implementing the model in a mixed complementarity format rather than adopting a nonlinear programming (optimization) approach. Final demand C ir of the representative agent RA r in each region is given as a CES composite which combines consumption of an energy aggregate with a non-energy consumption bundle. The substitution patterns within the non-energy consumption bundle as well as the energy aggregate are described by nested CES functions. CO 2 emissions are associated with fossil fuel consumption in production, investment, and final demand.
The Static Sub-Module
All goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a CES composite A ir of the domestically produced variety and a CES import aggregate M ir of the same variety from the other regions, the so-called Armington good (Armington, 1969) .
Domestic production either enters the formation of the Armington good or is exported to satisfy the import demand of other regions.
Endowments of labor and the specific resources are fixed exogenously. Capital supplies are price-responsive (see section 2.2.). Within any time period, we assume competitive factor and commodity markets such that prices adjust to clear these markets. 
Dynamics
The notion of consistent expectations is coupled with the simplifying assumption of an infinitely-lived representative agent who makes explicit choices at the margin between current and function consumption. The representative agent maximizes welfare subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. In equilibrium the present value of consumption equals the present value of income over the infinite horizon. Within a given period, however, a region may run a current account surplus or deficit, depending on the difference between national income and expenditure. 
MCP Implementation
Algebraically, our model is implemented as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The MCP formulation provides a general format for economic equilibrium problems that may not be easily studied in an optimization context. Only if the complementarity problem is "integrable" (see Takayma and Judge 1971) , the solution corresponds to the first-order conditions for a (primal or dual) programming problem. Given integrability, the nonlinear optimization problem can be interpreted as a market equilibrium problem where prices and quantities are defined using duality theory. In this case, a system of (weak) inequalities and complementary slackness conditions replace the minimization operator (see e.g. Rutherford 1995) . 4 However, taxes, income effects, spillovers and other externalities, interfere with the skew symmetry property which characterizes first order conditions for nonlinear programs. In contrast to various models for long-term policy assessment that adopt an explicit optimization approach (see e.g. Manne and Richels 2001), our modeling framework is directly suited to investigate policy interference in (real-world) second-best settings. Compared to equilibrium conditions cast as system of equations the MCP framework allows for a straightforward representation of restrictions on prices or quantities that may become binding in equilibrium or not. Numerically, the model is implemented in MPSGE (Rutherford 1999 ) as a subsystem of GAMS (Brooke et al. 1986 ) using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995) for solving the MCP problem.
Calibration
In quantitative policy analysis, the effects of policy interference are measured with respect to a reference situation -usually termed business-as-usual (BaU) -where no policy changes apply. When we want to simulate the potential effects of some policy measure, information on the future BaU development is required. Apparently, the BaU projections are a crucial determinant for the overall magnitude and distribution of adjustment costs For concreteness, 4 In this context, the term "mixed complementarity problem" (MCP) is straightforward: "mixed" indicates that the mathematical formulation is based on weak inequalities that may include a mixture of equalities and inequalities; "complementarity" refers to complementary slackness between system variables and system conditions.
exogenous policy constraints such as stabilization or temperature targets will bind future economies the more, the higher projected BaU growth in GHG emissions. Substantial differences in model-based analysis can often be traced back to different assumptions about the reference case. Yet, the central role of baseline assumptions in general receives little attention in the literature. Regarding long-term climate policy analysis, the issue of baseline projections becomes very critical in view of the tremendous uncertainties regarding BaU developments over several decades. Not only is there the question why one baseline should be preferable over another, but often projections based on partial equilibrium judgements/analysis stand out for large internal inconsistencies.
Against this background, a careful documentation of the baseline calibration is a conditio-sine-qua-non for the interpretation of results. In this section, we first describe the consistency conditions to calibrate a dynamic model along the global steady-state growth path. Second, we lay out a pragmatic approach how we can accommodate differential growth rates across various regions while avoiding potentially large deterioration in the terms of trade through the model horizon. Third, we sketch how exogenous projections on GHG emissions (i.e. in particular fossil fuel use) can be incorporated in a plausible manner along with projections of GDP growth rates. Fourth, we outline the inclusion of non-CO2 GHG abatement possibilities. Fifth, we describe the concrete parameterization of the intertemporal model that will be used for impact analysis of GHG alternative stabilization scenarios.
Steady-state calibration
The challenge in setting up a dynamic model is to reconcile the dynamic equilibrium conditions in terms of the benchmark data that incorporates base-year values for capital earnings, investment, and current account. Along the steady-state all quantities increase at the exogenous growth rate, while all prices expressed as present values decline at some interest rate (reflecting the pure rate of time preference). Steady-state growth implies mutual consistency of growth and interest rates together with capital earnings and investment values.
However, in the benchmark data set, the steady-state conditions are typically not satisfied for arbitrary assumptions on dynamic parameters such as the growth, interest, and depreciation rates. If we assume plausible values for the latter parameters, the steady-state capital values share implied by steady-state growth, e.g., differ substantially from reported base-year values.
To assure consistency and avoid re-calibration of the investment demand vector, one can calibrate capital and other factor shares to match the capital values share implied by the base year investment. For identical growth rates across all regions, this data adjustment assures consistency to steady-state growth.
Differential growth rates
In applied policy analysis, growth rate projections typically differ across regions. In this situation, the baseline equilibrium must be computed. When regions grow at different rates, there may be a substantial induced change in the terms of trade, and this makes it difficult to calculate a baseline growth path that matches economic targets such as investment and consumption. A pragmatic means of dampening changes in terms of trade for differentiated baseline growth rates is to adjust Armington share parameters over time in proportion to potential GDP. As a country grows faster, it is assumed that this produces an autonomous (non-price induced) change in the demand for the country's goods both in the home country as well as for the rest of the world. Since there is no change in the efficiency as a result of these demand adjustment, at base year prices, the cost of a unit of the aggregate commodity remains unchanged, even though there may be a substantial difference in the relative growth rates across countries. A final problem after the adjustment of Armington demand functions is related to assets rather than terms of trade and becomes evident in deviations between baseline and base year consumption. This reflects an inherent difficulty in setting up an equilibrium growth model in which the base year is not on a steady-state growth path. The level of net borrowing does not reflect earnings on assets -some of these capital flows represent ongoing changes in net asset positions as countries move toward the long-run equilibrium. In order to exactly replicate the base year consumption level, the level of net assets in the base year can be treated as a variable which is computed endogenously. These values are adjusted so as to produce a common base year consumption level in all regions.
Energy (Carbon) intensities
Standard baseline projections for climate or energy policy analysis include not only exogenous information on future GDP, but also detailed accounts on fossil fuel use, world market energy prices, and CO 2 emission profiles. In order to incorporate the energy data, we perform a two-step recalibration. First, we use the baseline intensities for fossil fuel demands to re-scale the baseline cost shares in the production of the electric and non-electric energy aggregates. In order to preserve the initial total costs per unit of production, we inversely adjust the capital cost shares, meaning that energy efficiency improvements are not costless but are linked to the increased use of capital services. Within the BaU re-calculation, we endogenously adjust the resource endowments of fossil fuels to calibrate the model to given exogenous target prices for fossil fuels. In a second step, we then recalibrate fossil fuel supply functions locally to match exogenous estimates of fossil fuel supply elasticities.
Parameterization
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, base year quantities and pricestogether with exogenous elasticities -determine the parameters of functional forms. The most comprehensive base year statistics on global trade and energy use are provided by the GTAP5 database that features consistent accounts of regional production and consumption, bilateral trade and energy flows for up to 66 countries/regions and 57 commodities in the year 1997 (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002) .
Considering the regional resolution of our climate policy analysis, the binding constraint comes from the availability of long-term baseline projections. Here we make use of the WEC/IIASA database that includes projections for GDP, fossil fuel use and carbon as well as methane emission profiles up to 2100 for eleven geo-politically important world regions and six alternative long-term futures (WEC/IIASA 1998). In order to reduce the computational burden for the numerical analysis, we have further aggregated the eleven regions to seven model regions. The sectoral aggregation in the model has been chosen to distinguish carbon-intensive sectors from the rest of the economy as far as possible given data availability. It captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement, such as differences in carbon intensities and the degree of substitutability across carbon-intensive goods. The energy goods identified in the model are coal, natural gas, crude oil, refined oil products and electricity.
Important carbon-intensive and energy-intensive non-energy industries that are potentially most affected by carbon abatement policies are aggregated within a composite energy-intensive sector. In order to keep track of the most important source for methane emissions, agriculture forms an explicit sector. The remaining manufacturers and services are aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good. The primary factors in the model include labor, physical capital and fossil-fuel resources. Table 1 summarizes the regional, sectoral, and factor aggregation of the model.
Among the six possible futures that are provided in the WEC-IIASA database, we use scenario B as our reference case. Scenario B is based on a cautious approach to technological change and energy availability as well as, modest economic growth. Table 2 provides an overview of central indicators for our reference scenario. 
Other manufactures and services Labor Savings good Capital
Fixed factor resources for coal, oil and gas 
The Climate Sub-Module
In order to assess climate change policy options we combine economic aspects In the RICE-99 environmental module only CO 2 is endogenously modeled. Other greenhouse gases and their radiative forcings are assumed to be exogenous. For our multi-gas analysis we endogenize CH 4 as the most important non-CO 2 greenhouse gas. The calibration of the extended environmental module is based on the MERGE climate module (Manne et al. 1994 ). Methane emissions result from different sources and are linked to economic activities in the economic model. These emissions build up a CH 4 stock. The base year stock of methane is assumed to be 4.850 billion tons of CH 4 of which 60 % are subject to decay with a yearly retention factor of 8.3 % reflecting the atmospheric lifetime. The increase in the stock of methane leads to an increase in the radiative forcing of methane which is proportional to the logarithm of the ratio of the current to the initial level and takes into account the interaction effects of CH 4 and N 2 O. The aggregate radiative forcing is again the sum of the radiative forcing for CO 2 , CH 4 and the other exogenous forcings. The temperature equations remain unchanged.
Our algorithm for computing "when-efficient" tax profiles involves iterative computation of the numerical derivatives of temperature with respect to greenhouse gas emissions (CO 2 and CH 4 in our case). It turns out that these partial derivatives are fairly stable, which makes it possible to compute time-efficient tax profiles without resorting to an optimizing framework.
Due to the large uncertainties in damage estimates for climate change, we do not attempt to translate global warming into market impacts (such as productivitiy changes, capital depreciation) and non-market impacts (such as biodiversity losses, natural disasters) (Manne et al., 1995) : There is only a one-way link between economic variables and biophysical variables. As a consequence, the welfare analysis is solely driven by economy-wide adjustment costs and restrictive GHG emissions control policies are necessarily welfare decreasing (in the absence of major second-best effects due to initial market distortions). The coupling of the economic system and climate system for our integrated CGE assessment is depicted in Figure 4 . 
Scenarios and Results
We distinguish two different climate control schemes. The first control scheme (Target) aims at stabilizing the long-term global temperature at an exogenously given level from 2100 onwards. Such a policy reflects the precautionary principle adopted by the UNFCCC to prevent global mean temperature rising beyond a certain threshold that could imply dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In our central case setting, temperature may not increase more than 90 % of the BaU temperature increase in 2100. The second control scheme (Rate) imposes an additional constraint on the rate of temperature change in addition to the long-term temperature stabilization target. This scenario reflects concerns that damages might not be only dependent on absolute temperature change but also on the rate of temperature change (see e.g. Peck and Teisberg, 1994, Alcamo and Kreileman 1996) .
5
In order to assess the importance of "what"-flexibility we combine each of the two control schemes with two alternative assumptions on the scope of greenhouse gases that are explicitly included. Variant CO 2 covers the case where only carbon emissions are subject to direct emission control measures. Variant Multigas explicitly includes various greenhouse gas emissions (in our case: CO 2 and CH 4 ) within the abatement strategy. In total, we thus obtain four scenarios whose characteristics are summarized in Table 4 . Across all scenarios, comprehensive "where"-flexibility applies, i.e. emissions will be abated where it is cheapest. Abstracting from external costs of climate change, we simply investigate the least-cost way to satisfy external policy constraints with respect to the choice of the control scheme and the scope of GHG emissions covered. Our scenarios are thus based on a cost-effectiveness paradigm rather than comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Without accounting for benefits 5 We approximate an upper bound on the decadal rate of change by specifying a set of temperature targets for each decade beginning in 2030.
from emission abatement, compliance to the exogenous emission control scheme necessarily involves global adjustment costs vis-à-vis the unconstrained business-as-usual.
6
In the exposition of results from our large-scale multi-sector, multi-region CGE model PACE, we focus on global cost implications across the different scenarios. At the regional level, compliance costs will to a large extent depend on the allocation of the (endogenous) global emission budget which emerges from the respective emission control policies. This leads to the fundamental issue of burden sharing, i.e. the question how abatement duties -or likewise emission entitlements -shall be allocated across countries. This issue has already dominated climate negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol and proved extremely difficult to resolve. We do not want to enter the controversial and highly subjective debate on equity principles here and adopt the economist's typical device to separate efficiency from equity considerations (handling some exogenous distributional objective by means of hypothetical lump-sum transfers).
Note that, abstracting from secondary income effects, the initial emission entitlement does not affect global efficiency given full flexibility. In principle, second-best effects such as the interaction of emission control schemes with existing distortionary taxes might offset the direct emission control costs yielding a double dividend (see Goulder 1995 , Bovenberg 1999 . In our analysis, we deliberately neglect the incorporation of major initial distortions owing to the aggregate nature of our global model that makes it difficult to reflect specific tax and transfer systems as well as institutional constraints -such as labor market rigidities -in an appropriate manner.
7
In our simulations we assume that in any period the BaU carbon emissions are scaled uniformly across regions to result in the (endogenous) global GHG emissions that are consistent with the temperature constraint. From an equity perspective, such an entitlement rule would reflect a sovereignty approach, where projected BaU emissions constitute a status quo right. Figure 7 shows the magnitude of carbon taxes that would be required to achieve the The course of the tax trajectories mirror the characteristics of the emission trajectories.
When climate policies only aim at long-term temperature targets there is a continuous increase in carbon taxes towards the end of the century reflecting economic rationality to postpone abatement as long as possible. Rate constraints trigger very high shadow prices in the initial periods whereas towards the end of the model horizon prices become very small or even zero (as rate constraints may no longer be binding). Figure 8 illustrates the tradeoffs between CO 2 and CH 4 based on efficiency prices that is the ratio of shadow values for these gases with respect to the long-term temperature target (scenario: Multigas-T Target ). As indicated by the natural science of the climate system this ratio increases over time since the impact of an additional emission unit CH 4 on the global mean temperature goes up relatively to the impact of an additional emission unit of CO 2 .
With its relatively short lifetime, the value of CH 4 increases as one approaches the temperature ceiling. The kink in 2080 reflects the "break-point" where the shorter lifetime of CH 4 vis-à-vis CO 2 does no longer matter with respect to the terminal temperature target. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the importance of "what"-flexibility for alternative emission control schemes that prescribe long-term temperature targets and eventually impose additional constraints on the rate of temperature change. In line with previous analysis, we
find that "what"-flexibility can provide substantial global efficiency gains as cost-efficient abatement options for non-CO 2 gases are directly taken into account. In our simulations, we have identified very large insurance premia when hedging against too rapid rates of temperature increase. We have also highlighted the shortcomings of the GWP approach to represent the contribution of different greenhouse gases to radiative forcing.
From a methodological point of view, the primary objective of our paper has been to lay out a multi-sector, multi-region CGE model PACE that entails a careful baseline calibration and provides a self-consistent simple representation of the connection between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (radiative forcing and temperature).
We close with several caveats. Although our model captures important economic aspects of long-term emission control schemes, it is only a crude approximation of the real world's technologies, preferences, endowments, etc. This applies in particular to longer-term analysis where substantial uncertainties about the future economic development prevail. Furthermore, our reduced from representation of the climate dynamics is very simplistic. Against this background we caution against too literal an interpretation of our numerical results.
